INTRODUCTION
The attempt to understand intelligence entails building theories and models of brains and minds, both natural as well as arti cial. From the earliest writings of India and Greece, this has been a central problem in philosophy. T h e a d v ent of the digital computer in the 1950's made this a central concern of computer scientists as well (Turing, 1950) . The parallel development of the theory of computation (by J o h n v on Neumann, Alan Turing, Emil Post, Alonzo Church, Steven Kleene, Markov and others) provided a new set of tools with which to approach this problem | through analysis, design, and evaluation of computers and programs that exhibit aspects of intelligent behavior | such a s t h e ability to recognize and classify patterns to reason from premises to logical conclusions and to learn from experience.
In their pursuit of arti cial intelligence and mind/brain modelling, some wrote programs that they executed on serial stored-program computers (e.g., Newell, Shaw and Simon, 1963 Feigenbaum, 1963) Others had more parallel, brain-like networks of processors (reminiscent o f t o d a y's connectionist networks) in mind and wrote more or less precise speci cations of what such a realization of their programs might look like (e.g., Rashevsky, 1960 McCulloch and Pitts, 1943 Selfridge and Neisser, 1963 Uhr and Vossler, 1963 ) and a few took the middle ground (Uhr, 1973 Holland, 1975 Minsky, 1963 Arbib, 1972 Grossberg, 1982 Klir, 1985 . 2 
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It is often suggested that two major approaches have emerged | symbolic arti cial intelligence (SAI) and (numeric) arti cial neural networks (NANN or connectionist networks) and some (Norman, 1986 Schneider, 1987 have even suggested that they are fundamentally and perhaps irreconcilably di erent. Indeed it is this apparent dichotomy b e t ween the two apparently disparate approaches to modelling cognition and engineering intelligent systems that is responsible for the current i n terest in computational architectures for integrating neural and symbolic processes. This topic is the focus of several recent books Goonatilake and Khebbal, 1994 Levine and Aparicioiv, 1994 Sun and Bookman, 1994) . This raises some important questions: What exactly are symbolic processes? What do they have t o d o with SAI? What exactly are neural processes? What do they have to do with NANN? What (if anything) do SAI and NANN have in common? How (if at all) do they di er? What exactly are computational architectures? Do SAI and NANN paradigms need to be integrated? Assuming that the answer to the last question is yes, what are some possible ways one can go about designing computational architectures for this task? This chapter is an attempt to explore some of these fundamental questions in some detail.
This chapter argues that the dichotomy b e t ween SAI and NANN is more perceived than real. So our problems lie rst in dispelling misinformed and wrong notions, and second (perhaps more di cult) in developing systems that take a dvantage of both paradigms to build useful theories and models of minds/brains on the one hand, and robust, versatile and adaptive i n telligent systems on the other. The rst of these problems is best addressed by a critical examination of the popular conceptions of SAI and NANN systems along with their philosophical and theoretical foundations as well as their practical implementations and the second by a judicious theoretical and experimental exploration of the rich and interesting space of designs for intelligent systems that integrate concepts, constructs, techniques and technologies drawn from not only SAI (Ginsberg, 1993 Winston, 1992 and NANN (McClelland and Rumelhart, 1986 Kung, 1993 Haykin, 1994 Zeidenberg, 1989 ), but also other related paradigms such as statistical and syntactic pattern recognition Fukunaga, 1990 Fu, 1982 Miclet, 1986 ), control theory (Narendra and Annaswamy, 1989) systems theory (Klir, 1969) , genetic algorithms (Holland, 1975 Goldberg, 1989 Michalewicz, 1992 ) and evolutionary programming (Koza, 1992) . Exploration of such designs should cover a broad range of problems in perception, knowledge representation and inference, robotics, language, and learning, and ultimately, i n tegrated systems that display what might be considered humanlike general intelligence.
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SHARED FOUNDATIONS OF SAI AND NANN
This section makes clear that the fundamental philosophical assumptions and scienti c hypotheses that have shaped both SAI and NANN research are identical. The shared foundations of SAI and NANN guarantee that there can be no fundamental incompatibility b e t ween the two paradigms for engineering intelligent systems or for modelling minds/brains.
SAI and NANN Share the Same Working Hypotheses
The fundamental working hypothesis that has guided most of the research i n arti cial intelligence as well as the information-processing school of psychology is rather simply stated: Cognition, or thought processes can, at some level, be m o delled b y c omputation. The philosophical roots of this hypothesis can be traced at least as far back as the attempts of Helmholtz, Leibnitz and Boole to explain thought processes in terms of mechanical (or in modern terms, algorithmic or computational) processes. This has led to the functional view of intelligence which is shared explicitly or implicitly by almost all of the work in SAI as well as NANN. Newell's physical symbol system hypothesis (Newell, 1980 ), Fodor's language of thought (Fodor, 1976 ), Minsky's society of mind (Minsky, 1986 ), Holland's classi er systems (Holland, 1986) , and most neural network models (McClelland and Rumelhart, 1986 Kung, 1993 Haykin, 1994 Zeidenberg, 1989 ) are all speci c examples of this functional view. In this view, intelligence can be characterized abstractly as a functional capability independent o f a n y commitments as to the speci c physical substrates that support the functions in question.
The primary means of describing the behavior of intelligent systems (be they natural or arti cial) within the SAI paradigm is in terms of their having knowledge and behaving in light of that knowledge. This is the so-called knowledgelevel description (Newell, 1990 ). But it is important t o r e m e m ber that descriptions at the knowledge-level represent just one of the many alternatives available.
The choice of what description to use in modelling intelligence, as in science in general, must be based on pragmatic considerations as determined by aspects of the phenomena being modelled and the sorts of explanations being sought. Satisfactory accounts of system behavior often make use of multiple 4 Chapter 12 levels of description along with the necessary means of mapping descriptions at one level into descriptions at adjacent levels.
Perhaps not so obvious is the fact that exactly the same functional view of intelligence is at the heart of current a p p r o a c hes to mimic i n telligent b e h a vior within the NANN paradigm, as well as the attempts to understand brain function using the techniques of computational neuroscience and neural modelling. The earliest work on neural networks by Rashevsky (1960) , McCulloch and Pitts (1943) and Rosenblatt (1962) nociteros62 | from which many o f today's NANN models are derived | illustrates this point r a t h e r w ell. So does the emphasis on computational models in the recent book on this topic by P atricia Churchland and Terrence Sejnowski (1992) suggestively titled The Computational Brain (This is not to suggest that brain modelling can ignore the particular biological substrates that realize the computations in question but just that the computational characterization of what the brains do provides a useful class of explanations and predictions of mental phenomena). It is important to note that NANN models or theories of intelligence are stated in terms of abstract computational mechanisms just as their SAI counterparts. The di erences (if any) from SAI are primarily in terms of the (often unstated) preference for functional descriptions of intelligent systems at a di erent l e v el of detail using a di erent set of primitives.
Some have (somewhat misleadingly) used the term neural level to refer to such descriptions. Today's NANN models are almost certainly grossly oversimpli ed caricatures of biological brains (Shepherd, 1989 (Shepherd, 1990 . It is far from clear that NANN are more suited to modelling brains any more than SAI Descriptions in terms of rules, tokens, and automata (typically associated with SAI systems) o er extremely useful descriptions of biological neural circuits at the cellular and molecular levels (Cooper, 1990) . (More on this later).
It should be clear from the discussion above that both SAI and NANN paradigms essentially o er two di erent description languages for describing systems in general and intelligent systems | minds/brains (be they natural or arti cial) | in particular. As pointed out by Chandrasekaran and Josephson (1994) , the commitment of most SAI researchers to biology in describing intelligence does not typically go beyond the knowledge level. Although perhaps not as obvious is the fact that an analogous situation holds for NANN models. NANN researchers pick out some interesting or relevant aspects of biological phenomena, and then proceed to formulate an abstract functional model (using abstract models of neurons) for the selected aspects of the phenomena chosen. The abstract descriptions in both cases are usually stated in su ciently general languages. One thing we know for certain is that such languages are all equivalent
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SAI and NANN Rely on Equivalent Models of Computation
Turing was among the rst to formalize the common-sense notion of computation in terms of execution of what he called an e ective procedure or an algorithm. In the process, he invented a hypothetical computer | the Turing machine. The behavior of the Turing machine is governed by an algorithm which is realized in terms of a program or a nite sequence of instructions. Turing also showed that there exists a universal Turing machine (essentially a general purpose stored program computer with potentially in nite memory) | one that can compute anything that any other Turing machine could possibly compute | given the necessary program as well as the data and a means for interpreting its programs. Several alternative models of computation were developed around the same time including lambda calculus of Church and Rosser, Post productions, Markov algorithms, Petri nets, a n d McCulloch-Pitts neural networks. H o wever, all of these models (given potentially in nite memory) were proved exactly equivalent t o t h e T uring Machine. That is, any computation that can be described by a nite program can be programmed in any general purpose language or on any T uring-equivalent computer (Cohen, 1986) . (However, a program for the same computation may b e m uch more compact when written in one language than in some other or it may execute much faster on one computer than some other). But the provable equivalence of all general purpose computers and languages assures us that any computation | be it numeric or symbolic | can be realized, in principle, by both SAI as well as NANN systems.
Given the reliance of both SAI and NANN on equivalent f o r m a l m o d e l s o f computation, the questions of interest have to do with the identi cation of particular subsets of Turing-computable functions that model various aspects of intelligent behavior given the various design and performance constraints imposed by t h e p h ysical implementation media at our disposal. It is generally accepted in arti cial intelligence and cognitive science that knowledge has to be represented in some form in order for it to be used. This is free of any commitment a s t o h o w a particular piece of knowledge is internally represented. However, implicit in this view is a commitment t o u s e some language (e.g., rst order logic, production rules, lambda calculus or LISP) to express and manipulate knowledge. Expressions in any s u c h language can be syntactically transformed into any other su ciently expressive language | this follows from the universality of the Turing framework. This is tantamount t o s a ying that systems that use knowledge are simultaneously describable at multiple levels of description. And systems (such as living brains or robots) that exist in the physical world would have p h ysical descriptions | just as the behavior of a computer can be described at an abstract level in terms of data structures and programs, or in terms of machine language operations that are carried out (thereby making the function of the hardware more transparent) or in terms of the laws of physics that describe the behavior of the physical medium which i s used to construct the hardware.
Note that this view is entirely consistent with that of Churchland and others (Churchland, 1986 Churchland and Sejnowski, 1992) who have a d v ocated the search for explanations of cognition at multiple levels. It is also important t o not lose sight of the fact that such a system is embedded within an external environment with which i t i n teracts in a closed loop fashion through sensors and e ectors and its body of knowledge is about its environment, its goals, its actions. This is the essence of grounding (see below).
Nature of Knowledge Representation
Given the central role played by k n o wledge representation in functional approaches to understanding and engineering intelligence, the nature o f r epresen-7 tation is among one the most fundamental questions in arti cial intelligence and cognitive science. Some insight i n to this question can be obtained by c o nsidering a concrete example. A common way to represent k n o wledge (at least in SAI) is with logic (Genesereth and Nilsson, 1987) . It is worth emphasizing that logic is not the knowledge itself it is simply a way of representing knowledge. (However, logic can be viewed as a form of meta-level knowledge about how t o r e p r e s e n t and reason with knowledge.) What logic enables us to do is represent the knowledge possessed by a n a g e n t using a nite set of logical expressions plus a process (namely, the inference rules of logic) for generating a ( p o t e n tially unlimited) set of other logical expressions that are part of the agent's knowledge. Thus if we represented an agent's knowledge in the form of expressions a and b, a n d i f a^b j = c, the agent has (implicit) knowledge of c even though c was not part of the (explicit) representation. In fact, rst order logic is universal in that it is powerful enough to represent essentially any k n o wledge that can be captured by a formal system. However, for certain types of knowledge to be used for certain purposes (e.g., knowledge of the sort that is captured by maps of some geographical region or a city), rst order logic representation may b e a wkward, indirect, or overly verbose.
If on the other hand, we w ere to choose a di erent w ay of representing knowledge of an agent, one which did not permit any logical deduction, then the agent's knowledge could be limited to those expressions that were explicitly included in the representation. Such a representation is in essence, simply a lookup table for the expressions in question. Thus, (for lack of a better term), the knowledge content of a representation may be limited by restricting either the inferences allowed, the form of the expressions that may be included (that is, limiting the expressive p o wer), or both. Indeed, it is often necessary to impose such limits on the power of representation in order to make their use computationally feasible (perhaps at the expense of logical soundness, completeness, or both).
In order for any system to serve the role of a representation (as used in most arti cial intelligence and cognitive science theories) it must include: an encoding process that maps the physical state of the external environment i n to an internal state processes that map transformations of the physical state of the external environment i n to appropriate (internal) transformations of the internal state a decoding process that maps an internal state into a physical state of the external environment | all subject to the constraint that the result of decoding the result of application of internal transformations of an internal state (obtained from encoding a physical state of the environment) is the same as the result of directly transforming the physical state of the external environment.
(This is perhaps a stronger requirement than is necessary | most likely in u-enced by the emphasis on logic. It is easy to see several ways of relaxing this constraint | b y a l l o wing the correspondence to be only approximate instead of exact, or attainable only with a certain probability. I t m ust also be mentioned that not everyone agrees with this view of representation through encoding See Bickhard, 1993 for a dissenting view). In short, representations are caricatures of selected aspects of an agent's environment that are operationally useful to the agent. Thus, certain mental operations on the representation can be used to predict the consequences of performing corresponding physical actions on the environment in which the agent operates.
Note that the internal transformations may be performed using LISP programs or production systems of SAI or by a suitably structured NANN. (Note however that the encoding and decoding processes are not purely symbolic because they have to deal with transduction or grounding. Also worth noting is the fact that most systems, be they SAI or NANN only simulate transduction and hence may l a c k grounding). Newell (1990) proposes an additional requirement for representations | namely that the application of encoding (sensing), internal transformations, and decoding (acting) must be executable on demand to the extent required to serve t h e purposes of the organism (which could be viewed essentially as the sensed internal environment of needs, drives, and emotions). Alternatively, or in addition, a set of encoders and decoders may b e u s e d i n conjunction with the ability to compose whatever sequence of transformations that may be necessary to form a representation. Most SAI systems take this route to the design of representations | by using a su ciently general language (e.g., LISP) that allows the composition of whatever functions that may b e 9 necessary to satisfy the appropriate representation laws. Most NANN systems take the same route as well | they just happen to use a di erent language with a di erent set of primitives for composing the necessary transformations.
Irrespective of the approach c hosen, the discovery of adequately powerful, efcient, and robust representations for any non-trivial set of tasks is still a largely unsolved problem. This is where learning and evolutionary processes play a major role. They must build the representations that perception and cognition utilize. One of the most informative c haracterizations of learning to date is in terms of storage of results of inference in a form that is suitable for use in the future (Michalski, 1993) . Learning can clearly provide an avenue for the discovery of the necessary compositions of transformations which i s a m ajor aspect of representation. However, note that both SAI and NANN systems presuppose the existence of some representation before they can discover other useful representations. (Therefore it appears that representations cannot come into existence without the existence of physical transducers and e ectors that connect such systems with the physical world, leading to the grounding problem | see below). This makes the initial representation or encoding extremely important. If it is not properly chosen (by the designer of the system or by evolution), it places additional (and perhaps insurmountable) burdens on the learning mechanisms (e.g., if the initial representation failed to capture spatial or temporal relations at a level of detail that is necessary for dealing with the problem domain).
It is far from clear that every task-speci c representation ever used by t h e system must be learned. Representations may be constructed as necessary to solve speci c problems and then discarded. Alternatively, some basic (learned or evolved) representations may be adapted in real time for solving speci c problems. This is an important aspect of the schema-based approach t o m o delling intelligence proposed by Arbib (1994).
As already pointed out, living brains appear to provide a rich panoply of representations | including analogical and iconic representations in the form of serial-parallel networks of topography-preserving projections (Ku er, Nicholls, and Martin, 1984 Zeki and Shipp, 1988 Uhr, 1986 Honavar, 1989 Honavar and Uhr, 1989a in the visual, auditory and motor cortices. Such representations have been largely ignored in today's SAI as well as NANN models. They may v ery well be among the essential representations grounded in the environment that form the foundation of a much larger representational edi ce that is needed for human-like general intelligence.
In short, SAI and NANN systems often di er in terms of the preferred form of knowledge representation used although any k n o wledge that can be represented in one can also be represented (albeit not as e ciently, robustly or elegantly) in the other. The challenge for engineers and cognitive modellers is to choose the right mix of SAI and NANN (and whatever other possibilities that exist) to meet the needs of the problem at hand.
A CLOSER LOOK AT SAI AND NANN
Given the shared philosophical and scienti c roots that SAI and NANN have i n common, why the great fuss about their integration? Answering this question entails taking a closer look at some prototypical SAI and NANN systems followed by a critical examination of what are generally considered their de ning characteristics and much-touted advantages and disadvantages. This examination demonstrates that despite assertions by some to the contrary, the di erences between them are less than what they might seem at rst glance and to the extent they di er, such di erences are far from being in any reasonable sense of the term, fundamental and that the purported weaknesses of each can potentially be overcome through a judicious integration of techniques and tools selected from the other (Honavar, 1990 Honavar and Uhr, 1990a Uhr and Honavar, 1994 Honavar and Uhr, 1994 Uhr, 1990 Boden, 1994 ).
Problem Solving as State Space Search State Space S e arch in SAI Systems
The prototypical SAI models are more or less direct descendents of the von Neumann stored program model of computation. The essential components of such a model are: a storage for programs (instructions for processing data), a processor for interpretation and execution of the program and a (transient) working memory for receiving inputs, and holding intermediate results of processing. Learning programs have additional mechanisms for self-modi cation (i.e., the modi cation of the set of programs that they use).
The dominant paradigm for problem solving in SAI is state space s e arch (Winston, 1992 Ginsberg, 1993) . States represent snap-shots of the problem at various stages of its solution. Operators enable transforming one state into another. Typically, the states are represented using structures of symbols (e.g.,
Resolving the AI/NN Dichotomy 11 lists). Operators transform one symbol structure (e.g., list, or a set of logical expressions) into another. The system's task is to nd a path between two speci ed states in the state-space (e.g., the initial state and a speci ed goal, the puzzle and its solution, the axioms and a theorem to be proved, etc.).
In almost any non-trivial problem, a blind exhaustive search for a path will be impossibly slow, and there will be no known algorithm or a procedure for directly computing that path without resorting to search. As a result, much work in SAI has focused on the study of e ective heuristic search procedures (Pearl, 1984) . For example, SAI systems handle games like c hess as follows: The initial board is established as the given, and a procedure is coded to compute whether a win-state has been reached. In addition, procedures are coded to execute legal moves and (usually) to compute heuristic assessments of the promise of each possible move, and to combine the separate heuristic assessments into an overall value that will be used to choose the next move. Finally, all these are put into a total structure that applies the appropriate heuristics, combines their results and evaluates alternative m o ves, and actually makes a move, then waits for and senses the opponent's moves, uses it to update the board (probably checking that it is indeed a legal move), and loops back t o make i t s o wn next move. (For simplicity the look-ahead with minimax t h a t most game-players use has been ignored, but that is essentially more of the same.)
Knowledge-Guided S e arch Search in general can be guided by the knowledge that is at the disposal of the problem solver. If the system is highly specialized, the necessary knowledge is usually built into the search procedure (in the form of criteria for choosing among alternative paths, heuristic functions to be used, etc.). However, general purpose problem solvers also need to be able to retrieve problem-speci c and perhaps even situation-speci c knowledge to be used to guide the search during problem-solving. Indeed, such retrieval might itself entail search (albeit in a di erent space). E cient, and exible representations of such k n o wledge as well as mechanisms for their retrieval as needed during problem solving are, (although typically overlooked because most current AI systems are designed for very specialized, narrowly de ned tasks), extremely important. This is an area where NANN or other implementations of content addressed memories and indexing schemes are especially worth exploring. 12 Chapter 12
State Space S e arch in NANN Systems
The NANN system (a network of relatively simple processing elements, neurons, or nodes) is typically presented with an input pattern or initialized in a given starting state encoded in the form of a state vector each of whose elements corresponds to the state of a neuron in the network). It is designed or trained to output the correct response to each input pattern it receives (perhaps after undergoing a series of state updates determined by the rules governing its dynamic behavior). The input-output behavior of the network is a function of the network architecture, the functions computed by the individual nodes and parameters such as the weights.
For example, the solution of an optimization problem (traditionally solved using search) can be formulated as a problem of arriving at a state of a suitably designed network that corresponds to one of minimum energy (which is de ned to correspond in some natural way to the optimality of the solution being sought). For an example of such an approach to theorem-proving, see (Pinkas, 1994) . Ideally, the network dynamics are set up so as to accomplish this without additional explicit control. However, in practice, state updates in NANN systems are often controlled in a manner that is not much di erent from explicit control (as in sequential update of neurons in Hop eld networks (Hop eld, 1982) where only one neuron is allowed to change its state on any update cycle) to guarantee certain desired emergent b e h a viors). Indeed, a range of cognitive tasks do require selective processing of information that often necessitates the use of a variety of (albeit exible and distributed) networks of cont r o l s t h a t i s p r e s e n tly lacking in most NANN models (Honavar and Uhr, 1990b) . Many s u c h c o n trol structures and processes are suggested by an examination of computers, brains, immune systems, and evolutionary processes.
In short, in both SAI and NANN systems, problem-solving involves state-space search and although most current implementations tend to fall at one end of the spectrum or the other, it should be clear that there exists a space of designs that can use a mix of di erent state representations and processing methods. The choice of a particular design for a particular class of problems should primarily be governed by performance, cost, and reliability considerations for arti cial intelligence applications and psychological and neurobiological plausibility for cognitive modelling.
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Symbols, Symbol Structures, Symbolic Processes Symbols
Knowledge representation as described earlier, generally implies the use of symbols at some level. The standard notion of a symbol is that it stands for something and when a symbol token appears within a symbolic expression carries the interpretation that the symbol stands for something within the context that is speci ed by its place in the expression. In general, a symbol serves as a surrogate for a body of knowledge that may need to be accessed and used in processing the symbol. And ultimately, t h i s k n o wledge includes semantics or meaning of the symbol in the context in which it appears, including that provided by the direct or indirect grounding of the symbol structure in the external environment (Harnad, 1990 ).
Symbolic Processes
Symbolic processes are essentially transformations that operate on symbol structures to produce other symbol structures. Memory holds symbol structures that contain symbol tokens that can be modi ed by s u c h processes. This memory can take s e v eral forms based on the time scales at which s u c h modications are allowed. Some symbol structures might h a ve the property o f d etermining choice and the order of application of transformations to be applied on other symbol structures. These are essentially the programs. Programs when executed | typically through the conventional process of compilation and interpretation and eventually | when they operate on symbols that are linked through grounding to particular e ectors | produce behavior. Working memory holds symbol structures as they are being processed. Long-term memory, generally speaking, is the repository of programs and can be changed by addition, deletion, or modi cation of symbol structures that it holds.
Such a system can compute any T uring-computable function provided it has su ciently large memory and its primitive set of transformations are adequate for the composition of arbitrarily symbol structures (programs) and the interpreter is capable of interpreting any possible symbol structure. This also means that any particular set of symbolic processes can be carried out by a n NANN | provided it has potentially in nite memory, o r n d s a w ay to use its transducers and e ectors to use the external physical environment to serve a s its memory).
14 Chapter 12 Knowledge in SAI systems is typically embedded in complex symbol structures such as lists (Norvig, 1992) , logical databases (Genesereth and Nilsson, 1987) , semantic networks (Quillian, 1968) , frames (Minsky, 1975) , schemas (Arbib, 1972 (Arbib, 1994 , and manipulated by (often serial) procedures or inferences (e.g., list processing, application of production rules (Waterman, 1985) , or execution of logic programs (Kowalski, 1977) carried out by a c e n tral processor that accesses and changes data in memory using addresses and indices.
It is often claimed that the NANN systems predominantly perform numeric processing in contrast to SAI systems which manipulate symbol structures.
Symbolic Processes in NANN systems
As already pointed out, NANN systems represent problem states using (typically binary) state vectors which are manipulated in a network of processors using (typically) numeric operations (e.g., weighted sums and thresholds). It is not hard to see that the numeric state vectors and transformations employed in such n e t works play an essential symbolic role although the rules of transformation may n o w b e a n e m e r g e n t property of a large number of nodes acting in concert. In short, the formal equivalence of the various computational models guarantees that NANN can support arbitrary symbolic processes. It is not therefore surprising that several alternative m e c hanisms for variable binding and logical reasoning using NANN have been discovered in recent y ears. Some of these require explicit use of symbols (Shastri and Ajjanagadde, 1989) others resort to quasi-symbols that have some properties of symbols while not being actually symbols in their true sense (Pollack, 1990 Maclennan, 1994 still others use pattern vectors to encode symbols (Dolan and Smolensky, 1989 Smolensky, 1990 Sun, 1994a Chen and Honavar, 1994 . The latter approach to symbol processing is often said to use sub-symbolic encoding of a symbol as a pattern vectors each of whose components is insu cient in and of itself to identify the symbol in question (see the discussion on distributed representations below). In any case, most, if not all, of these proposals are implemented and simulated on general purpose digital computers, so none of the functions that they compute are outside the Turing framework.
Numeric Processing
Numeric processing, as the name suggests, involves computations with numbers. On the surface it appears that most NANN perform essentially numeric processing. After all, the formal neuron of McCulloch and Pitts computes Resolving the AI/NN Dichotomy 15 weighted sum of its numeric inputs. And the neurons in most NANN models perform similar numerical computations. On the other hand, SAI systems predominantly compute functions over structures of symbols. But numbers are in fact symbols for quantities and any computable function over numbers can be computed by s y m bolic processes. In fact, general purpose digital computers have been performing both symbolic as well as numeric processing ever since they were invented.
Analog Processing
It is often claimed that NANN perform analog c omputation. Analog computation generally implies the use of dynamical systems describable using continuous di erential equations. They operate in continuous time, generally with physical entities such a s v oltages, currents, which s e r v e a s p h ysical analogs of the quantities of interest. Thus soap bubbles, servomechanisms, and cell membranes can all be regarded as analog computers (Rajaraman, 1981) .
Whether physically realizable systems are truly analog or whether analog system is simply a mathematical idealization of (extremely ne-grained) discrete system is a question that borders on the philosophical (e.g., are matter, time and space continuous or discrete?). However, some things are fairly clear. Most NANN are simulated on digital computers and compute in discrete steps and hence are clearly not analog. The few NANN models can be regarded as analog devices | e.g., the analog VLSI circuits designed and built by Carver Mead and colleagues (Mead, 1989 ) | are incapable of discrete symbolic computations (because of their inability t o m a k e all-or-none or discrete choices) (Maclennan, 1994) although they can approximate such computations. (For example, the stable states or attractors of such systems can be interpreted as identi able discrete states).
Analog systems can be, and often are simulated on digital computers at the desired level of precision. However, this might i n volve a time-consuming iterative calculation to produce a result that could potentially be obtained almost instantaneously (and transduced using appropriate transducers) given the right analog device. Thus analog processing appears to be potentially quite useful in many applications (especially those that involve perceptual and motor behavior). It is possible that evolution has equipped living systems with just the right repertoire of analog devices that help them process information in this fashion. However, it is somewhat misleading to call such processing computation (in the sense de ned by T uring) because it lacks the discrete combinatorial 16 Chapter 12 structure that is characteristic of all Turing-equivalent models of computation (Maclennan, 1994) .
Whether analog processes play a fundamental role (beyond being part of grounding of representations) in intelligent systems remains very much an open question. It is also worth pointing out that digital computers can, and in fact do, make use of essentially analog devices such as transistors but they use only a few discrete states to support computation (in other words, the actual analog value is irrelevant so long as it lies withing a range that is distinguishable from some other range). And when embedded in physical environments, both SAI and NANN systems do encounter analog processes through sensors and e ectors.
Compositionality and Systematicity o f Representation
It has been argued by many e.g., Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988 ) that compositionality and systematicity (structure sensitivity) of representation are essential for explaining mind. In their view, NANN are inadequate models of mind because NANN representations lack these essential properties. Compositionality i s t h e property that demands that representations must possess an internal syntactic structure as a consequence of a particular method for composing complex symbol structures from simpler components. Systematicity requires the existence of processes that are sensitive to the syntactic structure. As argued by S h a r k ey and Jackson (1994), lack of compositionality is demonstrably true only for a limited class of NANN representations and compositionality and systematicity in and of themselves are inadequate to account for cognition (primarily for lack of grounding or semantics). Van Gelder and Port (1994) have shown that several forms of compositionality can be found in NANN representations.
Grounding and Semantics
Many in the arti cial intelligence and cognitive science research c o m m unity agree on the need for grounding of symbolic representations through sensory (e.g., visual, auditory, tactile) transducers and motor e ectors in the external environment on the one hand and the internal environment of needs, drives, and emotions of the organism (or robot) in order for such representations (which are otherwise devoid of any i n trinsic meaning to the organism or robot) to be-come imbued with meaning or semantics (Harnad, 1990) . Some have argued that NANN systems provide the necessary apparatus for grounding (Harnad, Hanson, and Lubin, 1994) . It is important to realize that NANN as computational models do not provide physical grounding (as opposed to grounding in a simulated world of virtual reality) for representations any more than their SAI counterparts. It is only the physical systems with their physical substrate on which the representations reside that are capable of providing such grounding in physical reality when equipped with the necessary transducers and e ectors. This is true irrespective of whether the system in question is a prototypical SAI system, or a prototypical NANN system, or a hybrid or integrated system.
Serial versus Parallel Processing
As pointed out earlier, most of today's SAI systems are serial programs that are executed on serial von Neumann computers. However, serial symbol manipulation is more an artifact of most current implementations of SAI systems than a necessary property of SAI. In parallel and distributed computers, memory is often locally available to the processors and even can be almost eliminated in data ow m a c hines which model functional or applicative programs where data is transformed as it ows through processors or functions. Search i n S A I systems can be, and often is, parallelized by mapping the search algorithm onto a suitable network of computers (Uhr, 1984 Hewitt, 1977 Hillis, 1985 with varying degrees of centralized or distributed control. Many search problems that arise in applications such as temporal reasoning, resource allocation, scheduling, vision, language understanding and logic programming can be formulated as constraint satisfaction problems which often lend themselves to solution using a mix of serial and parallel processing (Tsang, 1993) .
Similarly, SAI systems using production rules can be made parallel by enabling many rules to be matched simultaneously in a data ow fashion (as in RETE pattern matching networks (Forgy, 1982) ). Multiple matched rules may b e allowed to re and change the working memory in parallel as in parallel production systems (Uhr, 1979) and classi er systems (Holland, 1975 ) | so long as whenever two or more rules demand con icting actions, arbitration mechanisms are provided to choose among the alternatives or resolve s u c h con icts at the sensory-motor interface. Such arbitration mechanisms can themselves be realized using serial, parallel (e.g., winner-take-all mechanism), or serial-parallel (e.g., pyramid-like hierarchies of decision mechanisms) networks of processes.
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NANN systems with their potential for massive ne-grained parallelism of computation o er a natural and attractive framework for the development of highly parallel architectures and algorithms for problem solving and inference. Such systems are considered necessary by m a n y researchers (Uhr, 1980 Feldman and for tasks such as real-time perception. But SAI systems doing symbolic inference can be, and often are, parallelized, and certain inherently sequential tasks need to be executed serially. O n a n y g i v en class of problems, the choice of decomposition of the computations to be performed into a parallel-serial network of processes and their mapping onto a particular network of processors has to be made taking the cost and performance tradeo s into consideration.
Knowledge Engineering Versus Knowledge Acquisition Through Learning
The emphasis in some SAI systems (especially the so-called knowledge-based expert systems (Waterman, 1985) ) on knowledge engineering has led some to claim that SAI systems are, unlike their NANN counterparts, incapable of learning from experience. This is clearly absurd as even a cursory look at the current research i n m a c hine learning (Shavlik and Dietterich, 1990 Buchanan and Wilkins, 1993 ) and much early work in pattern recognition (Uhr, 1973 Fu, 1982 Miclet, 1986 shows. Research in SAI and closely related systems indeed have provided a wide range of techniques for deductive (analytical) and inductive ( s y n thetic) learning. Learning by acquisition and modi cation of symbol structures almost certainly plays a major role in knowledge acquisition in humans who learn and communicate in a wide variety of natural languages (e.g., English) as well as arti cial ones (e.g., formal logic, programming languages). While NANN systems with their micro-modular architecture o er a range of interesting possibilities for learning, for the most part, only the simplest parameter or weight modi cation algorithms have been explored to date (McClelland and Rumelhart, 1986 et almr86 Kung, 1993 Haykin, 1993 . In fact, learning by w eight modi cation alone appears to be inadequate in and of itself to model rapid and irreversible learning that is observed in many animals. Algorithms that modify networks through structural changes that involve the recruitment of neurons (Greenough and Bailey, 1988 Honavar, 1989 Honavar and Uhr, 1989a Kung, 1993 Grossberg, 1980 ) appear promising in this regard.
A detailed discussion of learning is beyond the scope of this chapter. Su ces it to point out that most forms of learning can be understood and implemented in
Resolving the AI/NN Dichotomy 19 terms of structures and processes for representing and reasoning with knowledge (broadly interpreted) and for memorizing the results of such inference in a form that lends itself to retrieval and use at a later time (Michalski, 1993 ). Thus any NANN or SAI or some hybrid architecture that is capable of performing inference and has memory for storing the results of inference for retrieval and use on demand can be equipped with the ability to learn. The interested reader is referred to (Honavar, 1994 ) for a detailed discussion of systems that learn using multiple strategies and representations. Additional examples of systems that combine NANN and SAI approaches to learning can be found in (Uhr, 1973 Holland, 1975 Honavar, 1992 Honavar and Uhr, 1993 Lacher and Nguyen, 1994 Carpenter and Grossberg, 1994 Shavlik, 1994 Goldfarb and Nigam, 1994 Booker, Riolo, and Holland, 1994 . In short, SAI systems o er powerful mechanisms for manipulation of highly expressive structured symbolic representations while NANN o er the potential for robustness, and the ability to ne-tune their use as a function of experience (primarily due to the use of tunable numeric weights and statistics).
Associative as Opposed to Address-Based Storage and Recall
An often cited distinction between SAI and NANN systems is that the latter employ associative (i.e., content-addressable) as opposed to the address-and-index based storage and recall of patterns in memory typically used by the former. This is a misconception for several reasons: Address-and-index based memory storage and retrieval can be used to simulate content-addressable memory and vice versa and therefore unless one had access to the detailed internal design operation of such systems, their behavior can be indistinguishable from each other. Many SAI systems conventional computers use associative memories in some form or another (e.g., hierarchical cache memories). While associative r ecall may be better for certain tasks, address (or location-based) recall may b e more appropriate for others. Indeed, many computational problems that arise in symbolic inference (pattern matching and uni cation in rule-based production systems or logic programming) can take advantage of associative memories for e cient processing (Chen and Honavar, 1994) .
In prototypical NANN models, associative recall is based on some relatively simple measure of proximity or closeness (usually measured by Hamming distance in the case of binary patterns) to the stored patterns. While this may b e appropriate in domains in which related items have patterns or codes that are close to each other, it would be absurd to blindly employ s u c h a simple content-addressed memory model in domains where symbols are arbitrarily coded for storage (which w ould make hamming distance or a similar proximity measure useless in recalling the associations that are really of interest). Establishing (possibly context-sensitive) associations between otherwise arbitrary symbol structures based on their meanings and retrieving such associations e ciently requires complex networks of learned associations more reminiscent of associative k n o wledge networks, semantic networks (Quillian, 1968) , frames (Minsky, 1975) , conceptual structures (Sowa, 1984) , schemas (Arbib, 1994) , agents (Minsky, 1986) and object-oriented programs of SAI (Norvig, 1992 ) than today's simple NANN associative memory models. This is not to suggest that such structures cannot be implemented using suitable NANN building blocks | see (Arbib, 1994 Dyer, 1994 Miikkulainen, 1994a Bookman, 1994 Barnden, 1994a 1994b) for some examples of such implementations. Indeed, such NANN implementations of complex symbol structures and symbolic processes can o er many potential advantages (e.g., robustness, parallelism) for SAI.
Distributed Storage, Processing, and Control
Distributed storage, processing, and control are often claimed to be some of the major advantages of NANN systems over their SAI counterparts. It is far from clear as to what is generally meant b y the term distributed when used in this context (Oden, 1994 ).
Perhaps it is most natural to think of an item as distributed when it is coded (say as a pattern vector) whose components by themselves are neither su cient to identify the item nor have a n y useful semantic content. Thus, the binary code for a letter of the alphabet is distributed. Any item thus distributed eventually has to be reconstructed from the pieces of its code. This form of distribution may be in space, time, or both. Thus the binary code for a letter of the alphabet may be transmitted serially (distributed in time) over a single link that can carry 1 bit of information at a time or in parallel (distributed in space) using a multi-wire bus. If a system employs such a m e c hanism for transmission or storage of data, it also needs decoding mechanisms for reconstructing the coded item at the time of retrieval. It is easy to see that this is not a de ning property of NANN systems as it is found in even the serial von Neumann computers. In any e v ent, both NANN as well as SAI systems can use such distributed coding of symbols. And, as pointed out by Hanson and Burr (1990) , distributed coding in and of itself, o ers no representational capabilities that are not realizable using a non-distributed coding.
In the context of NANN, the term distributed is often used to refer to storage of parts of an item in a unit where parts of other items also stored (for example, by superposition). Thus, each unit participates in storage of multiple items and each item is distributed over multiple units. (There is something disconcerting about this particular use of the term distributed in a technical sense: Clearly, one can invent a new name for whatever it is that a unit stores | e.g., a number whose binary representation has a`1' in its second place. Does the system cease to be distributed as a result?). It is not hard to imagine an analogous notion of distribution in time instead of space but it is also fraught with similar semantic di culty.
The term distributed when used in the context of parallel and distributed p r ocessing, generally refers to the decomposition of a computational task into more or less independent pieces that are executed on di erent processors with little or no inter-processor communication (Uhr, 1984 Almasi and Gottlieb, 1989 ). Thus many processors may perform the same computation on pieces of the data (as in single-instruction-multiple data or SIMD computer architectures) or each processor may perform a di erent computation on the same data e.g., computation of various intrinsic properties of an image (as in multiple-instruction-single-data or MISD computer architectures), or a combination of both (as in multiple-instruction-multiple-data or MIMD computer architectures). Clearly, both NANN and SAI systems can take a d v antage of such parallel and distributed processing. The reader is referred to (Almasi and Gottlieb, 1989 Uhr, 1984 ) for examples.
Redundancy and Fault Tolerance
Often the term distributed is used more or less synonymously with redundant and hence fault-tolerant in the NANN literature. This is misleading because there are many w ays to ensure redundancy of representation, processing and control. One of the simplest involves storing multiple copies of items and/or using multiple processors to replicate the same computation in parallel, and using a simple majority v ote or more sophisticated statistical evidence combination processes to pick the result. Redundancy and distributivity are orthogonal properties of representations. And clearly, SAI as well as NANN systems can be made redundant and fault-tolerant using the same techniques. It is often claimed that NANN models provide noise-tolerant and robust inference because of the probabilistic, fuzzy, or evidential nature of the inference mechanisms used. This is largely due to combination and weighting of evidence from multiple sources through the use of numerical weights or probabilities. It is possible to establish the formal equivalence inference in certain classes of NANN models with probabilistic or fuzzy rules of reasoning. But fuzzy logic (Zadeh, 1975 Yager and Zadeh, 1993) operates (as its very name suggests), with logical (hence symbolic) representations. Probabilistic reasoning is an important and active area of research in SAI as well (See Pearl, 1988 for details). Heuristic evaluation functions that are widely used in many SAI systems provide additional examples of approximate, that is, not strictly truth-preserving inference in SAI systems. In many SAI systems, the requirements of soundness and completeness of inference procedures are often sacri ced in exchange for e ciency. I n s u c h cases, additional mechanisms are used to (after the fact) verify and if necessary, o verride the results of inference if they are found to con ict with other evidence.
Much research o n h uman reasoning indicates that people occasionally draw inferences that are logically unsound (Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991). This suggests that although people may be capable of applying sound inference procedures, they probably take shortcuts when faced with limited computational or memory resources. Approximate reasoning under uncertainty is clearly an important tool that both SAI and NANN systems can potentially employ t o e ectively make rapid, usually reliable and useful, but occasionally fallible inferences in real time.
SAI and NANN As Models of Minds/Brains
Some of the SAI research d r a ws its inspiration from (rather super cial) analogies with the mind and mental phenomena and in turn contributes hypotheses and models to the study of minds Similarly, m a n y NANN models draw t h e i r inspiration from (albeit super cial) analogies with the brain and neural phenomena and in turn contribute models that occasionally shed light o n s o m e aspects of brain function (Churchland and Sejnowski, 1992 ). 23 It is important to emphasize that neither today's SAI nor today's NANN have the monopoly on modelling minds and brains. Today's NANN models are at best, extremely simpli ed caricatures of biological neural networks (Shepherd, 1989 McKenna, 1994 . Biological neurons and microcircuits of neurons provide computational primitives that are far more powerful than simple threshold or sigmoids that are used in most NANN models (Uhr, 1994) . Brains display highly structured yet exible organization into regions, layers, and modules that perform specialized functions (Ku er, Nicholls and Martin, 1984 Zeki and Shipp, 1988) . Such n e t works may be modelled by highly structured NANN models that organize the neurons into locally connected, topography preserving layers that are organized in loosely hierarchical fashion (Uhr, 1986 Honavar and Uhr, 1989a Honavar, 1992 . Such structures appear to organize the networks of the brain in space (in ways that re ect the physics of the environment using networks of analog representations) and time (through the use of feedback loops with varying amounts of delay, networks of clocks and osciallators).
The brain appears to perform symbolic, numeric, as well as analog processing. The pulses transmitted by neurons are digital the membrane voltages are analog (continuous) The molecular level phenomena that involve closing and opening of channels appears to be digital The di use in uence of neurotransmitters and hormones appear to be both analog and digital.
Changes in learning appear to involve both gradual changes of the sort modeled by the parameter changing or weight modi cation algorithms of todays NANN as well as major structural changes involving the recruitment of neurons and changes in network topology (Greenough and Bailey, 1988 Honavar, 1989 Honavar and Uhr, 1989a . In fact, learning by w eight modi cation alone appears to be inadequate in and of itself to model rapid and irreversible learning that is observed in many animals.
Also missing from most NANN models are elaborate control structures and processes of the sort found in brains including networks of oscillators that control timing. Perception, learning and control in brains appear to utilize events at multiple spatial and temporal scales (Grossberg, 1982) . Additional processes not currently modelled by NANN systems include processes that include networks of markers that guide neural development, structures and processes that carry information that might be used to generate other network structures, and so on (Honavar and Uhr, 1990 ).
Clearly, living minds/brains are among the few examples of truly versatile intelligent systems that we h a ve t o d a y. They are our existence proof that such 24 Chapter 12 systems are indeed possible. So even those whose primary interests are in constructing arti cial intelligence systems can ill a ord to ignore the insights o ered by a study of biological intelligence (McKenna, 1994) . (This does not of course mean that such an e ort cannot exploit alternative t e c hnologies to accomplish the same functions, perhaps even better than their natural counterparts). But it is a misconception to assume that today's NANN model brains any more than today's SAI programs model minds. In short, the processes of the minds appear to be far less rigidly structured and far more exible than today's SAI systems and the brains appear to have a lot more structure, organization, and control than today's homogeneous networks of simple processing elements which w e call NANN. A rich space of designs that combine aspects of both within a well-designed architecture for intelligence remains to be explored.
INTEGRATION OF SAI AND NANN
It must be clear from the discussion in the previous sections that at least on the surface it looks like SAI and NANN are each appropriate, and possibly even necessary for certain problems, and grossly inappropriate, almost impossible, for others. But of course each c a n d o a n ything that the other can. The issues are ones of performance, e ciency and elegance (and in cognitive modelling, perhaps plausibility in terms of the various known constraints between di erent l e v els | such as psychological, neurobiological, and neurochemical | at which satisfactory explanations are sought), and not theoretical capabilities as computational models.
This is a common problem in computing. One computer or programming language may be extremely well-suited for some problems but awful for others, while a second computer or language may be the opposite. This suggests several engineering possibilities , including:
1. Try to re-formulate and re-code the problem to better t the computer or language. 2. Use one computer or language for some parts of the process and the other for others. 3. Build a new computer or language that contains constructs from each, and use these as appropriate. 4. Try to nd as elegant as possible a set of primitives that underlie both computers or languages, and use these to build a new system. 25 The term hybrid is beginning to be used for systems that in some way t r y t o combine SAI and NANN. If any of the above is called a hybrid probably all of the others should also. But usually hybrid refers to systems of type 2] or 3]. Types 3] and 4] would appear to be better than 2] (although harder to realize), since they would probably be more e cient and more elegant. Thus the capabilities of both SAI and NANN should be combined by tearing them apart to the essential components of their underlying processes and integrating these as closely as possible. Then the problem should be re-formulated and re-coded to t this new system as well as possible. This restates a general principle most people are coming to agree on with respect to the design of multicomputer networks and parallel and distributed algorithms: the algorithm and the architecture should be designed to t together as well as possible, giving algorithm-structured architectures and architecture-structured algorithms (Uhr, 1984 Almasi and Gottlieb, 1989 ).
SUMMARY
SAI and NANN each demonstrate at least one way of performing certain tasks naturally and thus pose the interesting problem for the other of doing something equivalent perhaps more elegantly, e ciently, or robustly than the other. It should be clear from the discussion above that the integration of SAI and NANN systems can be bene cially explored along several dimensions.
In the short term, hybrid architectures that use NANN and SAI modules to perform di erent b u t w ell-coordinated sets of functions in speci c applications are de nitely worth exploring. A partial list of examples of such i n tegration include: neural network and expert knowledge based systems (Lin and1990 Gallant, 1994 Uhr, 1973 Holland, 1975 Booker, Riolo, and Holland, 1994 Lacher and Nguyen, 1994 Carpenter and Grossberg, 1994 Dyer, 1994a . These e orts o er a number of important i n s i g h ts into the design and performance of such h ybrid systems for cognitive modelling on the one hand and engineering intelligent systems for practical applications on the other (see below).
The integration of concepts, constructs, techniques and technologies drawn from SAI and NANN as well as other closely related paradigms (including statistical pattern recognition, syntactic pattern recognition, evolutionary computation) o ers a rich and potentially very promising design space for exploration by arti cial intelligence engineers and cognitive theorists. It is becoming increasingly obvious that this space exhibits almost in nite variety t h a t is characteristic of complex systems. In the long-term, a coherent theoretical framework for analysis and synthesis of such systems has to be developed. In order to do this, we need to start developing and re ning our categorization of such m utually inter-related systems. One way to approach this task is to seek categorizations that capture essential underlying principles of the architecture, alternative implementations of the architecture, and nally alternative o r physical realization of the candidate implementations of such systems relative t o o u r goals of understanding and engineering intelligence.
Because of the engineering and technological emphasis of arti cial intelligence, most research in the area has focused on the development of algorithms for speci c tasks that appear to require intelligence if performed by h umans (e.g., diagnosis, planning, character recognition). While such e orts provide useful technological tools in the short term, they appear to have fallen short of providing much insight i n to alternative implementations and physical realizations of architectures for general intelligence.
Most arti cial intelligence and cognitive science theories of intelligence are primarily about the content o f k n o wledge or types of knowledge for some task of interest, with minimal commitment on the choice of architecture (or equivalently, the programming language that de nes the virtual architecture of the computer). Perhaps this is because it is tacitly assumed that any s u c h a r c hitecture is one that is capable of supporting universal computation and that nothing else about it is of much i n terest. Perhaps this is where the dichotomy b e t ween SAI and NANN can help focus our attention on architectural issues. After all, NANN models do (in most cases) represent architectural commitment(s) that are di erent from those implicitly assumed by SAI models (e.g., lambda calculus or production systems). However, it must be emphasized that one architectural commitment is not necessarily better than another independent o f 27 the task for which the architecture is used. Also worth noting is the fact that the same system may be lend itself to multiple architectural descriptions. Each such description can potentially add to our understanding of di erent aspects of the system in important w ays. Furthermore, each architectural description lends itself to multiple implementations For example, the same architecture can be implemented using a network of simple processors or simulated by a program on a conventional serial computer. And each implementation lends itself to multiple physical realizations.
Living minds/brains o er an existence proof of at least one architecture for general intelligence. SAI and NANN paradigms together o er a wide range of architectural choices. Each a r c hitectural choice brings with it some obvious (and some not so obvious) advantages as well as disadvantages in the solution of speci c problems using speci c algorithms, given certain performance demands and design constraints imposed by t h e a vailable choices of physical realizations of the architecture. Together, the cross-product of the space of architectures, algorithms, and physical realizations constitutes a large and interesting space of possible designs for intelligent systems. Examples of systems resulting from a judicious integration of concepts, constructs, techniques and technologies drawn from both traditional arti cial intelligence systems and arti cial neural networks clearly demonstrate the potential bene ts of exploring this space. And, perhaps more importantly, the rather severe practical limitations of today's SAI and NANN systems strongly argues for the need for a systematic exploration of such design space. 
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